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Abstract
Taxpayer behaviour has in South Africa moved to the forefront of the investigation of revenue 
collection with regular tax awareness campaigns being launched by the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS). Issues relating to tax amnesty and the contribution of the informal sector (second 
economy) to tax revenue have become important. This paper attempts to find explanations, be they 
economic or psychological, for taxpayer behaviour in South Africa. Factors influencing tax evasion 
and ultimately collection targets are thus examined. A questionnaire was designed to determine 
how individuals, in this case a sample of students, respond when filing taxes. Each question frames 
a scenario to invoke a specific tax regime. 
The paper’s unique findings show, generally, that behaviour is to a large extent determined by 
economic factors, specifically inequality as predicted by the expected utility theory. This theory also 
successfully predicts 50 per cent of the responses to the control questions. The remaining 50 per 
cent are explained by combined economic and psychological factors, modelled by the prospect 
theory. This is significant considering the fact that the results were generated within a developing 
and not a developed context as is the case in most studies of this type. 
JEL H21, O47
1 
Introduction
Finding the correct explanation for tax evasion 
can be challenging particularly in the context 
of a developing country. Issues such as tax 
literacy (theoretical and practical knowledge of 
tax systems) and societal attitudes towards tax 
compliance must be explored. Tax awareness and 
behaviour have long been debated globally among 
academics and economists, and performance-
orientated revenue authorities have become a 
familiar sight worldwide. In South Africa, the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) has 
an unprecedentedly successful and unmatched 
record since its establishment in 1997. It had 
consistently surpassed tax collection targets 
(NTSA, 2003), which suggests that the country’s 
tax administration will only become more 
efficient and transparent overall, with reduced 
levels of tax evasion, although the tax gap still 
exists (SARS, 2004). Backlogs appear to have 
been cleared to a large extent and tax morale 
improved. Tax amnesty and awareness campaigns 
have been launched by SARS, including informal 
sector participants (thus improving the so-called 
second economy’s contribution). In these efforts 
factors influencing tax collection have assumed 
greater and greater importance, although as yet 
little research has been conducted to explore 
the links between improved revenue collection 
in South Africa and enhanced confidence in 
the government on the part of citizens (positive 
citizen attitudes). 
This paper is thus the first attempt in the 
South African context to address this gap. It 
uses a slightly unusual approach, known as the 
prospect theory of behavioural response, to 
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explore tax evasion and compliance. This theory 
takes societal attitudes, emotions, feelings 
and/or perceptions about taxation in general 
as its base. Economic, psychological and social 
factors are then considered as determinants 
of tax compliance or evasion. The theory 
incorporates two different approaches. On 
the one hand, psychological theory views tax 
regimes in terms of equity, postulating that when 
regimes are considered fair, compliance will be 
high. On the other hand, traditional economic 
theory assumes that rational agents maximise 
their expected utility (this despite the fact 
that behavioural studies have long shown that 
individual responses are inconsistent with the 
theory; individuals make systematic ‘mistakes’, 
for instance, choosing to comply with a tax 
regime even though expected utility might 
expect them to cheat). The prospect theory 
attempts to combine these two approaches, 
within the bounds of unavoidable constraints 
of course, as an alternative way of studying tax 
evasion. 
This paper is divided into three sections. 
The first section gives the background and 
purpose for the research, including a theoretical 
overview of potential factors determining tax 
evasion. These factors can be either economic 
or psychological. The second section investigates 
the empirical results. The last section concludes 
with a summary of the results and suggestions 
for further research. This paper is actually thus 
a stepping-stone for further research of this 
nature, specifically in the context of a developing 
country. 
2 
Background and purpose
The tax gap is defined as the difference between 
the expected and actual revenue generated by 
tax authorities. The gap exists firstly because 
individuals and business understate their 
incomes; overstate deductions, credits or 
exemptions; or make calculation errors on their 
returns. Secondly, some taxpayers do not file 
the required returns or file these after they are 
legally due. Finally, tax authorities sometimes 
make errors in assessment. In South Africa, 
the tax gap has ranged from as low as about 10 
per cent to as high of 33 per cent or more (Katz 
Commission, 1994). 
Before addressing specific factors that 
could possibly influence the tax gap, such as 
taxpayer behaviour (including tax evasion), 
it is essential to look at changing tendencies 
in the global tax environment. In the global 
economic environment, income tax bases are 
continuously thinning as governments’ ability to 
tax capital flows deteriorate. In addition, since 
the bulk of revenue is collected from income 
tax, especially corporate tax, in developing 
countries, the protection of the individual and 
the corporate tax base has become crucial. The 
so-called vanishing taxpayer or tax entity has 
become a force to be reckoned with (Economist, 
2000). As the developing world becomes more 
deregulated and integrated, following in the 
footsteps of its industrialised counterparts, it is 
imperative that tax strategies and/or tax policies 
be appropriately designed and continuously 
monitored so as to optimise revenue collection 
and ultimately support the strategies of revenue 
authorities. Rapid advances in computer 
and telecommunications technology and a 
new emphasis by professional firms on the 
development and marketing of so-called tax 
products might in future re-define traditional 
tax evasion as ‘avoidance measures’.
Lower corporate tax burdens worldwide could 
relate to the apparent shift away from corporate 
taxation (internationally mobile tax bases) to 
individual income taxation and commodity 
taxation (which are perceived as the less mobile 
tax bases). Disconcertingly, in some countries 
this shift has resulted in an overall reliance on 
individual taxes rather than on corporate taxes. 
With labour becoming more mobile, especially 
skilled labour from developing countries 
(World Bank, 2000) and general consumption 
taxes becoming the fastest growing revenue 
source, the future protection of the individual 
income tax base as revenue generator must be 
emphasised. 
A higher degree of world economic integration 
has also resulted from the unification of many 
currencies, such as the introduction of the euro. 
This widens the scope for harmful practices such 
as tax competition even further (see EC, 1997 
and OECD, 1998). Taxation therefore remains 
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an important feature of unification and often 
affords countries an opportunity to export part 
of their tax burden to other countries (Tanzi, 
1996: 20). This obviously creates the possibility 
of abuse, such as the utilisation of tax addresses 
in tax havens, and/or the shifting of operations 
or use of transfer pricing by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) with the financial capacity 
to try these tax avoidance methods. Such 
practices to lower tax bills through tax avoidance 
and evasion have also become widespread 
among individual tax payers.
2.1 Overview of factors determining 
 taxation
Before investigating tax evasion further, the 
possible factors determining taxation in general 
and influencing the South African tax system 
specifically must be clearly understood. 
From the earliest times there have been different 
views on the impact of taxes. Smith (1776) points 
out that ‘high taxes frequently afford a smaller 
revenue to government than what might be 
drawn from more moderate taxes’. Supply-side 
economists go further, raising concerns about 
how taxes can discourage private savings and 
investment. The debate is ongoing, and different 
assumptions are used in various models. 
One of the best known of these models, which 
explains tax burdens, is the Laffer theory. This 
model places the optimal tax rate for a country 
somewhere between a zero and 100 per cent 
tax level; this optimum level will yield the 
highest return to government with the minimum 
excess burden to influence total output. Some 
studies therefore find that a tax cut may lead 
to increased government revenue depending 
on where the country lies on the Laffer curve. 
However, the Laffer theory is based on some 
debilitating assumptions that are problematic 
considering the dynamic setting of the revenue 
effects the curve attempts to predict. These 
are (a) the assumption that the government 
adheres to its original consumption and transfer 
programmes, despite the tax cut boost which 
may contribute to the growth rate of output, 
and/or (b) the assumption that the government 
is committed to maintaining its expenditure/
output ratio after the tax cut. 
This example shows how problems can arise 
in attempts to analyse the impact of taxation 
on various variables. The assumptions made 
in some studies may need interrogation, 
necessitating study not only of financing needs 
but also of expenditure realities. Further, 
although higher tax levels can reduce growth 
rates in a developing environment, this is 
extremely difficult to research systematically 
and coherently (Newberry & Stern, 1987: 13). 
The definition of economic growth and the 
delineation of the factors that influence it (e.g. 
aggregate demand) are of crucial importance 
in studies of this nature. Also, effective tax 
rates should be taken into account. These 
are determined by a number of variables 
such as statutory tax rates, deductibility of 
interest, depreciation allowances, special 
investment incentives and the integration of 
personal and corporate income taxes. When 
different types of investment are considered, 
no general conclusion can be drawn about 
which country has the highest tax burden 
(OECD, 1991). Calculating the effective tax 
rate for multinational investment is even more 
complicated. It depends on whether foreign 
source income is taxed in the host country, or 
in the home country of residence, or in both. 
The intricacies involved in the determination 
of the precise effects of changing taxes and 
simultaneous changes in the tax base are 
enormous (see UNCTAD, 1998). 
The theory of optimal taxation is a purely 
normative theory and does not specifically allow 
for a separate analysis of, for example, corporate 
income taxes. Undoubtedly this relates to the 
complex nature of corporate taxes. The theory 
also does not predict what a real-world tax 
system should look like nor does it explain how 
these tax systems emerge. However, it does 
clearly explain the tax mix. Conventional theory 
argues for a tax mix that is as diverse as possible. 
The tax system should therefore not rely on only 
one type of tax, since this could weaken the 
system in the long term. Taxation involves social 
marginal costs of public funds (SMCPF) and the 
more diverse the tax mix, the lower the costs will 
be. Tax revenues should therefore be collected 
from a wide variety of taxes. On this point, 
optimal commodity tax theory puts forward 
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similar arguments, the inverse elasticity rule for 
instance, although the reverse application of this 
rule is advocated in a developing context. 
The theory of optimal taxation, however, does 
not address the broad application of corporate 
income taxes. The only extensive theoretical 
analysis here relates to behavioural responses of 
companies to corporate taxes (see Jorgenson, 
1963). But again, this analysis (the Neoclassical 
Model), does not include factors influencing 
corporate income taxes, rather focusing on the 
reverse, that is, the effect of corporate taxes 
on various factors, such as user cost of capital. 
Investigating corporate income taxes, which 
in this study is taken as referring to statutory 
and average corporate income tax (CIT), 
must thus begin with an extensive description 
of all the factors that could influence the 
determination of this type of tax. Firstly, CIT 
rate and revenues could be expected to rise 
as government spending (relative to GDP) or 
revenue (developmental/social security) needs 
increase over time and across countries. If this is 
not the case, CIT will be determined by a range 
of alternative factors. 
Governments operate in a market system 
alongside the private sector in financing and 
providing services, and may by their very actions 
distort the decisions of the private sector. 
The conventional belief that taxing income 
entails a higher welfare (efficiency) cost than 
taxing consumption is primarily based on the 
observation that income tax consists of two 
broad components, namely labour tax and 
capital tax. Since labour tax is equal to a tax on 
consumption in an inter-temporal framework, 
income tax gives rise to an additional distortion, 
distortion of savings, which is absent from the 
commodity tax. In the traditional neoclassical 
growth model, the length of the consumer’s 
planning horizon plays a crucial role in the 
theoretical ambiguity of the relative superiority 
of commodity tax. If saving decisions are based 
on life-cycle considerations, the optimal mix 
of income and commodity taxes will depend 
entirely on relevant elasticities, that is, of 
labour supply and savings. In contrast to this 
model, new endogenous growth theory adds 
a crucial component, human capital, to the 
analysis, which complicates the analysis and 
makes results relatively more ambiguous (Tanzi 
& Zee, 2001).
It follows that an optimal tax structure must 
be designed within the analytical framework of 
a second-best world (Frenkel, Razin & Sadka, 
1991: 99). The theory of second best is applicable 
where multiple tax instruments are available. 
It holds that policies which in isolation would 
increase tax efficiency can in the presence of 
certain distortions actually decrease it and 
vice versa. Finding the benchmark for optimal 
taxation starts with the aggregate production 
efficiency theory (Diamond & Mirrlees, 1971). 
According to this theory, assuming that the 
government is not constrained in its choice of 
tax type, an optimal tax structure is one that 
does not distort production decisions. Such 
a structure minimises output, which is then 
divided between consumption and government 
spending. The existence of tax differentials will 
therefore usually have a distorting effect on 
savings and investments between regions. 
The implication of this aggregate production 
efficiency theorem is that the source principle is 
always inferior to the residence principle, which 
alone guarantees the absence of distortions in 
individuals’ investment and production choices. 
In this model, tax principles, also called tax 
assignment rules, determine the jurisdiction of 
the national tax rate over capital income and 
commodities. These principles determine both 
the distribution of tax revenues between regions 
and the tax rate that is levied on international 
investment and trade. In the absence of lump-
sum taxes, therefore, this model predicts 
that tax policy is optimally chosen in an open 
economy when the country operates on its 
consumption possibility frontier and does not 
distort production (Dixit & Norman, 1980; 
Frenkel, et al., 1991). This result rests on some 
strict assumptions, firstly, that the government’s 
choice of taxes is not constrained in any way and 
secondly, that foreign countries do not react 
to tax reforms. This can only be true when the 
country reforming its tax is small and the change 
has a negligible effect on prices in all markets.
With this theoretical base, we next turn to tax 
legislation in South Africa and more specifically 
those measures that provide for the treatment 
of tax evasion.
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2.2 Tax legislation in South Africa
Tax evasion is difficult to analyse and 
measurement practices are dogged by 
imprecision and controversy (see Schneider & 
Enste, 2000).2 The OECD (2002) launched an 
investigation into the similarities between the 
techniques used to commit tax crimes and those 
used to launder the proceeds of other crimes. 
The findings show that money laundering 
regulations cover crimes involving fiscal fraud 
or other tax crimes in more than half of the 
28 member countries involved in the survey. 
The OECD report therefore recommends the 
release of information gathered by anti-money-
laundering authorities to tax authorities. Again, 
the vanishing taxpayer is a concern, suggesting 
that a ‘World Tax Organisation’ could assist 
with tax cooperation and harmonisation 
worldwide. 
In South Africa, section 103 of the Income Tax 
Act (Act No 58 of 1962) differentiates between 
tax evasion on the one hand and tax avoidance 
and tax planning on the other. Tax evasion is 
based on the non-disclosure of information 
to the tax authorities in an effort to evade tax. 
Impermissible tax avoidance involves contrived 
arrangements that are designed to exploit 
perceived loopholes in tax law. Permissible tax 
planning involves finding the most advantageous 
option in the tax legislation but accepting all 
the economic and legal consequences of that 
option. 
In 2005, an announcement was made by the 
National Treasury of South Africa (NTSA, 2005) 
which called for an overhaul of the general anti-
avoidance rule in section 103 of the Income Tax 
Act, which was considered to be outdated. The 
SARS released a discussion paper exploring 
the details of this overhaul. The paper discusses 
short-term revenue loss as an immediate 
concern, as well as the following:
• a growing disrespect for the tax system and 
the law, 
• a corrosive effect on taxpayer com-
pliance, 
• increasingly complex tax legislation and a 
concomitant increase in the compliance 
burden for everyone, 
• the uneconomical re- or misallocation of 
resources, 
• an unfair shifting of the tax burden, and 
• a weakening of the ability of Parliament 
and National Treasury to set and implement 
economic policy. 
The paper also mentions legitimate countervailing 
measures in an attempt to strengthen the anti-
avoidance rule. These measures include, among 
others, increased uncertainty for taxpayers, 
inhibition of legitimate and/or innovative 
transactions, and the ‘uneasy tension’ that exists 
between the general anti-avoidance rule and the 
rule of law (subjectivity versus objectivity). 
As possible solutions for these problems, the 
paper suggests major changes to section 103 of 
the Income Tax Act including the introduction 
of new penalties for scheme promoters and for 
taxpayers who substantially underreport their 
income, and simplification and clarification 
of the regulations. However, we suggest in 
this paper that revenue authorities must also 
reconsider the economic and psychological 
factors behind tax evasion. Answering the 
question of why taxpayers underreport their 
income might be more important than inventing 
new penalties.
2.3 Economic reasoning behind tax 
 evasion 
One of the earliest of the theories that try to 
provide a suitable explanation for tax evasion, 
the expected utility theory, describes decision-
making in terms of uncertainty. Decision-
makers are viewed as rational and their 
preferences as determined by various utilities, 
such as transitivity, dominance and invariance. 
These utilities are weighed by their respective 
probabilities and individuals maximise their 
expected utility subject to certain assumptions 
or constraints. While expected utility theory 
assumes that taxpayers are averse to risk (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstein, 1944), various other 
possibilities have been recognised with the main 
criticism that the characteristics of transitivity, 
dominance and invariance do not always apply 
(see Tanzi & Shome, 1993; OECD, 1991, 1998 
& 2002; Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001). 
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Tax evasion has typically been explained 
using economic theory. Within this theoretical 
framework, tax evasion behaviour is described 
as a function of the probability of detection 
and the size of the penalties imposed. Trivedi, 
Shehata and Mestelman (2005) indicate that 
the efficacy of increasing penalties and audits 
on tax evasion depends on the reasons why 
taxpayers comply or fail to comply. Their 
report suggests that economic approaches to 
describing and predicting taxpayer behaviour 
alone are not adequate and that further research 
could be based on social psychology. Since 
the seminal economic study on tax evasion by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), a wealth of 
research has been published which focuses on 
psychological explanations of tax evasion, some 
of it in the context of developing countries. One 
approach is to use behavioural and experimental 
measurement instruments that correlate better 
with self-reported tax evasion. 
2.4 Psychological reasoning behind tax 
 evasion
The first group of theoretical explanations 
concentrates on social comparisons. Individuals 
compare their situation with other groups 
and select information from ‘similar others’. 
Vogel’s study (1974) is important in this 
field. It distinguishes between internalisation, 
identification and compliance, and specifies 
three objective factors that help determine 
evasion, namely the individual exchange 
relationship with the government, social 
orientation and opportunities for evasion. These 
factors are found to have both direct and indirect 
effects on tax attitudes and evasion. This study 
is thus an important early attempt to focus on 
the moral dimension of taxpayer behaviour 
and to deal with individual differences in this 
behaviour.
Kinsey (1984) concludes from his survey 
of relevant literature that underreporting 
of income is the most popular form of tax 
evasion. Smith and Kinsey (1987) describe 
a conceptual framework for understanding 
taxpayer behaviour. They distinguish between 
the process and content of decision-making, 
and emphasise that people do not take a single 
decision to evade tax. Evasion involves a series 
of actions, such as deliberately ‘forgetting’ to 
submit tax returns or mentally redefining some 
earnings as non-taxable. These actions form a 
process which moves people from their habitual 
compliant response to a conscious decision to 
evade tax or cheat. During this process, people 
who choose to cheat tend to weigh certain 
specific factors such as material consequences, 
normative expectations, socio-legal attitudes 
and expressive factors. 
Material consequences and normative 
expectations are most important of these factors. 
The rapidity with which consequences are felt 
and the private nature of taxpaying, which limit 
the impact of normative expectations, must 
be considered in the design of any evasion 
prevention measures. If the evader just has to 
keep quiet to avoid consequences, only guilt can 
possibly trouble him/her, since there is little to 
fear in terms of public shame. The other two 
factors, socio-legal attitudes and expressive 
factors, are less often included in analyses of 
tax evasion. Of these factors, attitudes towards 
government spending and the tax system are 
most significant (also see Kirchler, 1998).
Elffers and Hessing (1997) approach tax 
evasion as defective behaviour within a social 
dilemma, which involves what is best for the 
individual and the group. Their methodology 
is worth mentioning for possible future testing 
in South Africa. In the case of tax evasion, an 
individual will benefit if that individual alone 
evades tax rather than if more people evade tax. 
This social dilemma mostly occurs when there 
is a considerable increase in tax caused by an 
increase in non-payment in some areas, such as 
in the case of small/micro/medium enterprises 
and taxi industries where self-employed trades 
and professions persist, i.e. where income is not 
affected by the paying or withholding of tax and 
various warranted expenses are deductible. This 
may in return, fuel resentment and non-payment 
in future. However, the determinants of taxpayer 
behaviour need to be interpreted with caution, 
depending on the method of assessment used. 
Both attitudes and personality characteristics 
can account for taxpayer behaviour. It also 
appears that a greater opportunity for tax 
evasion is associated with self-reports, which 
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indicates that attitudes and subjective norms are 
significantly correlated with tax evasion. 
Social dilemma research focuses on the 
motivational orientation of taxpayers, whether 
individualistic, competitive or co-operative. 
Two theoretical variables are proposed, namely 
instigations and constraints, found in an 
individual and his/her social setting. For 
example, financial strain or the amount owed 
after underreporting (see Warneryd & Walerud, 
1982) is a situational instigation and its opposite 
psychological counterpart is personal strain or 
difficulty in meeting the tax obligations and 
perceived unfairness of tax laws and authorities 
(see Lewis, 1982; Groenland & Van Veldhoven, 
1983). Thus in this model the variables occur in 
mirror pairs. Social conditions or social norms 
mirror psychological conditions, for example 
a personal orientation, which is a self-serving 
rather than a community orientation, will lead to 
tax evasion behaviour (also see Carroll, 1992). 
The second group of theoretical explanations 
for tax evasion concentrates on equity. Individuals 
evade taxes to restore balance or equity in the 
tax system. Klepper and Nagin (1989) stress 
two tendencies in the taxpayer’s mental make-
up. Firstly, taxpayers will usually not take risks 
even if they can clearly see the best outcome 
resulting from this risk. Secondly, taxpayers 
prefer to be lazy and procrastinate anyway 
even when reminded about deadlines all the 
time. According to Lewis, Webley and Furnham 
(1995), tax evasion is a moral question, since we 
create inequities by evading taxes. In general, 
this approach assumes that paying tax is never 
popular, even when taxpayers recognise it as 
legitimate and the government expenditure it 
will finance as highly desirable. It is unlikely that 
human disposition will change in this respect.
2.5 Alternative explanations for tax 
 evasion 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide an 
alternative explanation for tax evasion behaviour 
in the form of the prospect theory. Tvede and 
Ghiglino (1999) refer to this theory as one 
of the most influential and best-documented 
phenomena in economic psychology. Prospect 
theory is based on the assumption that people 
evaluate gains or losses from some neutral 
status quo as reference point. People are not 
rational decision-makers at all, but instead tend 
to adapt to any constant in their lives until they 
find this constant neutral. Thus when people 
expect a profit from the taxman, they will opt 
for risk-avoidance behaviour in the form of 
a safe, risk-free strategy to collect the profit 
by returning their tax return forms as soon as 
possible. However, if they are expecting a loss, 
they become risk takers by suppressing part of 
their taxable income to the verge of or just over 
the limit of what is permissible. 
These economic and psychological theories 
can be tested in various ways to assess which one 
best explains taxpayer behaviour. One approach 
is to study the impact of the implementation of 
legislative changes. Another approach, which 
is used in this study, is to ask actual taxpayers 
(students), with the goal of finding the best 
way to study tax evasion behaviour and to form 
a theory which best explains this behaviour. 
Since considering all existing economic and 
psychological theories is beyond the scope of 
this paper, certain relevant theories have been 
chosen.
3 
Methodology and explanation of 
main findings
The case study or experiment was conducted 
at the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, and 195 
students participated in the study. The use of 
students in experiments and surveys is common 
(see Alm et al., 1993; King & Sheffrin, 2002). 
Participation in the study was voluntary. The 
students were undergraduates. We asked them 
four questions relevant to the research topic. 
Each question was introduced by a framing 
scenario, which focused the question on a par-
ticular aspect of tax behaviour. The answers 
were compared with the assumptions and 
predictions of prospect theory; if they differed, 
better matches were looked for in alternative 
theories, namely social comparison, exchange 
equity and expected utility theory, and, where 
possible, in alternative explanations to these 
existing theories. 
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To avoid any possible disadvantages of using 
students as subjects in this study, we included 
a control question (included in the appendix) 
for each real question to isolate the effects 
of the framed tax situation in the experiment. 
The controlled questions were presented to 
participants as casino gambles and therefore had 
no apparent link to the framing scenarios of the 
real questions. In this way, the differences in the 
responses could be attributed to the frame. 
The questionnaire was entitled: ‘Questionnaire 
to determine which theory best explains the 
public’s tax behaviour’, and introduced with 
this paragraph: 
In most countries there is disagreement 
on the fairness of the tax system. In South 
Africa, some taxpayers feel that the tax 
system is unfair, e.g. because unnecessary 
expenditure on arms places a large burden 
on the public. However, many feel that South 
Africa has a fair tax system because the tax 
base is wide enough so that individuals pay 
a fair amount of tax. Choose between either 
(a) or (b) and (c) or (d) for each question 
by ticking the appropriate box.
The questions were split into two groups, namely 
Group A, the framed questions for Questions 
1–4 and Group B, the control questions for 
Questions 1–4. Thus each framed question had 
a control question. Question 5 was a general 
question. 
Each question will now be presented with 
its results and a possible explanation of these 
findings. Table 1 presents a summary of the 
responses to Questions 1–5. 
Question 1 investigates the certainty effect and 
social comparison theory.
The SARS reports that tax evasion among 
those with incomes in excess of R500 000 is at 
an all-time high, and the SARS does not have 
the resources to investigate and punish all these 
evaders. Imagine that this year you have high 
medical expenses that you thought would count 
as allowable medical deductions. However, 
when you file your return, you discover that 
the expenses are not high enough to qualify 
for deductions. This means that your tax bill is 
R1 000 higher than you expected. You are 
preparing your tax return. 
Which option, a or b, do you prefer?
a) Claiming an allowable tax deduction that 
will save you R500 in taxes
b) Claiming a ‘non-allowable’ deduction that 
has an 80 per cent chance of being accepted 
by the SARS, and which saves you R1 000 
in taxes
Which option, c or d, do you prefer?
c) Claiming a deduction that has a 25 per 
cent chance of being accepted by the SARS 
which saves you R500 in taxes
d) Claiming a deduction that has a 20 per 
cent chance of being accepted by the SARS 
which saves you R1 000 in taxes
In this question, options c) and d) are similar 
to a) and b) but exaggerated by 25 per cent. 
According to prospect theory, individuals are 
more averse to losses that are certain than to 
losses that are probable, even if the probable loss 
has a higher mathematical expectation. Prospect 
theory therefore predicts that individuals will 
choose a) and d) because of the certainty effect. 
Equity theory predicts that individuals will 
choose b) and d) because individuals attempt to 
restore inequity in the tax system, that is, they 
originally perceive the system as unfair. 
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Table 1 
Summary of mean responses to all questions
Mean Responses
Question
Framed
Control
Significance Ho: Framed = Control
P value
1 (a)
54%
77%
1.3
(0.24)
1 (b)
46%
23%
1 (c)
37%
28%
3.16
(0.00)
1 (d)
63%
72%
Question
Framed
Control
Significance Ho: Framed = Control
P value
2 (a)
60%
74%
1.2
(0.18)
2 (b)
40%
26%
2 (c)
63%
57%
2.0
(0.00)
2 (d)
37%
43%
Question
Framed
Control
Significance Ho: Framed = Control
P value
3 (a)
75%
64%
0.4
(0.64)
3 (b)
25%
36%
3 (c)
79%
55%
3.2
(0.00)
3 (d)
21%
45%
Question
Framed
Control
Significance Ho: Framed = Control
P value
4 (a)
56%
62%
1.2
(0.30)
4 (b)
44%
38%
4 (c)
52%
43%
2.4
(0.00)
4 (d)
48%
57%
Question 5 (a) 5 (b) 5 (c)
4% 
(n=9)
50% 
(n=97)
46% 
(n=89)
The response to Question 1 shows that 
participants tend to follow the prospect theory, 
though not overwhelmingly: 54 per cent of the 
participants chose option a) over b) and 63 per 
cent chose option d) over option c). 
Question 2 investigates loss aversion and 
exchange equity.
Imagine you have just read a report that the SA 
General Accounting Office has found that the 
government spent R10 billion on missiles that 
cannot be used in South African equipment. 
This means that the government wasted R10 
billion. You are preparing your tax return and 
at filing find that you under-withheld, and owe 
R10 000 in taxes. 
Which option, a or b, will you take?
a) Not reporting cash income, which will save 
you R1 500 in taxes
b) Not reporting income from defence stock 
dividends, which is 25 per cent likely to not 
save you any tax
Which option, c or d, do you prefer?
c) Not reporting cash income, which means 
you owe R8 500 in taxes
d) Not reporting income from defence stock 
dividends, which is 25 per cent likely to save 
to tax, and 75 per cent likely of making you 
liable for R10 000 in tax.
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Prospect theory indicates that people take 
risks when faced with loss and avoid risk when 
faced with gain, a phenomenon known as loss 
aversion. Choices a) and b) are identical to 
c) and d), except that a) and b) are framed 
as gains and c) and d) as losses. Therefore, a 
respondent who chooses a) should also choose 
c). Prospect theory predicts that individuals 
will choose a) and then d) because of loss 
aversion. However, equity theory suggests b) 
and d) since individuals attempt to restore 
inequity. 
The results in Table 1 show that the respondents 
chose a) (60 per cent) and d) (63 per cent). This 
result is not consistent with prospect theory. The 
same result distribution is seen in responses 
to the control questions: a) (74 per cent) and 
d) (57 per cent). Respondents therefore acted 
consistently throughout and ‘irrationally’ 
as predicted by expected utility theory. The 
results are also consistent with equity theory. 
If the tax system is viewed as inequitable, this 
theory predicts that taxpayers will evade taxes 
in order to restore equity in the system. These 
choices also indicate that the respondents did 
not choose the safe option (not reporting) but 
preferred the risky option (not reporting income 
from defence stocks). That is, under inequitable 
situations, these individuals are willing to take 
risks to restore equity. 
Question 3 also investigates loss aversion and 
social comparison theory.
Imagine that your co-worker informs you 
that he has been claiming a non-allowable 
deduction on his taxes and has never been 
caught. He further informs you that his brother-
in-law, who works for the SARS, has been 
claiming the same deduction for years without 
a penalty. He says the probability of an audit 
is 10 per cent. 
Which option, a or b, do you prefer?
a) Claim your usual deductions, which saves 
you R1 000 in taxes
b) Claim the ‘non-allowable’ deduction your 
colleague has described, which has a 33 per 
cent probability of a tax saving of R4 000 and 
66 per cent probability of not saving you any 
tax
Which option, c or d, do you prefer?
c) Claim your usual deductions so that you owe 
R4 000 in taxes
d) Claim the ‘non-allowable’ deduction, which 
means you have a 33 per cent probability 
of owing R1 000 in taxes and 66 per cent 
probability of owing R5 000 in taxes? 
Question 3 is similar to Question 2, but focuses 
on peer opinion and normative expectations 
rather than on exchange inequity (between 
the individual and the government). Previous 
work has found that individuals tend to seek 
advice from similar others such as co-workers 
(even if their tax situations are not the same). 
Moreover, advice about tax evasion methods 
sends a signal to individuals that tax evasion 
is acceptable, that is, that one will not be a 
social outcast if caught evading tax. Again, 
options a) and b) are framed as gains and 
options c) and d) as losses. Therefore, the 
same predictions would apply to Question 3 
as to Question 2. 
The results in Table 1 show that 75 per cent 
of participants chose a) and 79 per cent chose 
c), because options a) and c) are the same but 
framed differently. As for question 2, also, the 
responses to the control questions show a similar 
pattern: 64 per cent of participants chose a) and 
55 per cent chose c). There responses are again 
consistent with equity theory. 
Question 4 investigates the certainty effect and 
exchange equity.
Suppose that in 2004 the government proposed 
to spend R10 billion on education. However, 
instead of voting for the education bill, Parliament 
voted for a bill that would prop up tobacco farms 
in KwaZulu-Natal. The newspapers report that 
heavy lobbying by the tobacco industry swayed 
the vote. 
Which option, a or b, do you prefer?
a) Claim a tuition tax credit, which saves you 
R5 000 in tax
b) Claim tuition fees as a business expense, 
which has a 50 per cent chance of saving 
you R15 000 and a 50 per cent chance of 
not saving you anything
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Which option, c or d, do you prefer?
c) Claim a tuition tax credit, which has a 20 
per cent chance of saving you R5 000
d) Claim tuition fees as a business expense, 
which has a 10 per cent chance of saving 
you R15 000 and a 10 per cent chance of 
not saving you anything
Options c) and d) are the same as options a) and 
b) except that their probabilities are multiplied 
by 20 per cent. According to prospect theory, 
individuals will choose a) and d) because they 
are more averse to losses that are certain than to 
losses that are probable, even is the probable loss 
has a higher mathematical expectation. Given 
that the scenario depicts inequity, participants 
may choose option b) over a) as they take risks to 
restore inequity. The results in Table 1 show that 
56 per cent of participants chose a) over b) and 
52 per cent chose c) over d). These results are 
similar to those of Questions 2 and 3. They are 
not consistent with prospect theory but rather 
with expected utility theory. For the first time in 
this study, however, the results from the control 
questions are consistent with prospect theory. 
For the first four questions, the responses to 
the framed and control questions for options 
c) and d) differ significantly at the 1 per cent 
confidence level. It is thus clear that the only 
difference between the experimental/framed 
questions and the control questions are the 
inclusion of a frame depicting an inequitable 
situation. Therefore, the inequity frame alters 
how the participant responds to the question. 
Question 5 investigates the participant’s 
general disposition towards tax evasion.
General considerations regarding tax evasion:
Which option, a, b or c, would you prefer?
a) Cheating on your taxes
b) Cheating on your taxes under certain 
circumstances
c) Never considering cheating on your taxes
The majority of the participants in the experiment 
indicated that they would consider cheating on 
their taxes under certain circumstances, with 4 
per cent choosing option a); 50 per cent option 
b); and 46 per cent option c). However, one 
cannot read too much into this result because 
only 4 per cent of the respondents indicated that 
they would cheat on their taxes. In this context, 
the results seem to be robust. 
Thus this survey used a short introduction that 
framed a scenario to invoke an opinion of the 
tax regime as fair or unfair. Once the scenario is 
established, the next step was to determine how 
the individual will respond when filing taxes. The 
frame therefore differs according to what type of 
inequity is being measured (exchange or social). 
In the second stage, participants were asked to 
choose between different gambles. The gambles 
were structured so as to force participants to 
reveal their preferences. The purpose was to 
identify whether individual behaviour follows 
the pattern predicted by prospect theory, given 
a scenario that frames a perception of inequity. 
However, feelings of inequity or negative 
emotions driven by inferiority could induce 
actions that are incompatible with loss aversion 
or the certainty effect.
4 
Concluding remarks and 
suggestions for future research
This paper attempts to explore the psychological 
basis for tax compliance, framing compliance 
in terms of behavioural response. In South 
Africa, taxpayer behaviour has recently received 
increased attention following the launch of tax 
awareness campaigns by the revenue authority 
(SARS). Factors influencing tax collection 
such as behavioural response have become 
paramount for future policy-making. 
The paper’s results show a generally consistent 
response to the framing scenarios, reflecting in 
terms of economic factors the assumptions of 
the expected utility theory. In general, then, 
the responses to the framed questions are not 
consistent with prospect theory. Expected utility 
theory also explains 50 per cent of the responses 
to the control questions. The remaining 50 per 
cent are explained by prospect theory. The 
responses to the control questions therefore 
conflict with those to the real questions, in 
that the control responses correspond with 
prospect theory. One may argue that South 
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Africa has a tax-paying culture, unlike many 
other developing nations. The country does not 
suffer from tax revolts and protests, suggesting 
that in South Africa tax collectors benefit from 
a compliant culture built up over many years, 
which should be strong enough to ensure higher 
compliance when managerial methods improve. 
The outcome of any studies on tax evasion in 
South Africa may thus be expected to be more 
in line with results from a developed context. 
The results of this study are exciting and 
unique because they open up further theoretical 
perspectives in the form of psychological 
explanations for tax compliance behaviour. 
Although the control questions do improve 
the robustness of the results somewhat, the 
main questions, because not intended to reveal 
participants’ motivation towards a specific 
behaviour, did not explore the participants’ 
decisions in any depth. Another limitation is 
that the participants were students, and so 
not necessarily experienced in tax practices. 
However, these limitations offer opportunity for 
future exploration. Taxpayers, both individuals 
and businesses, could be interviewed, at the 
beginning and at the end of the tax season, to 
show their thoughts and behaviour when filing 
tax forms and doing preparatory work. 
Appendix: Group B questions 
(control questions)
1. Which option would you prefer?
 (a) a sure win of R500
 (b) an 80 per cent chance of winning 
 R1 000
 Which option would you prefer?
 (c) a 25 per cent chance of winning R500
 (d) a 20 per cent chance of winning R1 000
2. Suppose you already owe a casino R10 000. 
You have a final opportunity to play the 
following game. Which of the following 
options would you choose?
 (a) a sure gain of R1 500
 (b) a 25 per cent chance of gaining R10 000 
 and 75 per cent chance of nothing
 Which of the following options would you 
choose?
 (c) not reporting cash income, meaning you 
 owe R8 500 in taxes
 (d) not reporting income from defence 
 stock dividends, which has a 25 per cent 
 probability of reducing your taxes and 
 75 per cent probability of making you 
 liable to paying R10 000 in taxes
3. Suppose you already owe a casino R10 000. 
You have a final opportunity to play the 
following game. Which of the following 
options would you choose?
 (a) a sure gain of R1 500
 (b) a 25 per cent chance of gaining R10 000 
 and 75 per cent chance of nothing
 Which of the following options would you 
choose?
 (c) claiming your usual deductions so that 
 you owe R4 000 in taxes
 (d) claiming the ‘non-allowable’ deduction, 
 which means you have a 33 per cent 
 probability of owing R1 000 in taxes and 
 66 per cent probability of owing R5 000 
 in taxes
4. Which of the following options do you 
prefer?
 (a) a sure win of R5 000
 (b) a 50 per cent chance of winning R15 000 
 and a 50 per cent chance of winning 
 nothing
 Which of the following options do you 
prefer?
 (c) a 20 per cent chance of winning R5 000
 (d) a 10 per cent chance of winning R15 000 
 and a 10 per cent chance of winning 
 nothing
Endnotes
1 The views expressed are those of the author 
and do not necessarily represent those of 
the South African Reserve Bank or Reserve 
Bank policy. The authors are grateful to the 
Department of Statistics at the University 
of Pretoria as well as to Dr J.J. van Tonder, 
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retired staff member of the Department 
of Economics, University of Pretoria, for 
invaluable input and assistance. 
2 Interested readers are referred to Alm and 
Martinez-Vazques (2003) for an account, 
which though not completely relevant to the 
current paper is interesting, of tax evasion 
in developing and transition countries.
3 Data was collected through survey/
questionnaires handed out in a class 
situation to first- and second-year Economics 
students taking the EKN120 and EKN 252 
courses at the University of Pretoria. 
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